Abstract-It is often claimed that the fact that some wrongs are public is a fact that is important to our thinking about permissible criminalization. We argue that it is not. Some say: what gives us reason to criminalize wrongs-when we have such a reason-is the fact that those wrongs are public. Others say: the fact that a wrong is public is a necessary condition of there being reason to criminalize that wrong, or of its permissible criminalization. What we should make of these statements depends on what is meant by a public wrong. If the claim that a wrong is public is simply the conclusion of a sound argument that there is reason to criminalize the wrong, or that the wrong is permissibly criminalized, the above statements are true, but trivially so. If the claim that a wrong is public is a premise in an argument that there is reason to criminalize the wrong, or that the wrong is permissibly criminalized, the above statements, we argue, are false. We conclude that it would be better, when we think about permissible criminalization, to do without the idea of a public wrong.
principle (and perhaps the offence principle too). To go into battle with the latter is to reveal oneself as a liberal who thinks that the mere prevention of immorality is itself no reason to criminalize, and that such a reason exists only if criminalization will likely prevent harm (or offence). To go into battle with the former is to reveal oneself as a moralist who thinks that the fact it will likely prevent immoralities is sufficient reason to justify creating a crime.
This way of characterising the debate is multiply problematic. For one thing, those on the liberal side need not claim that preventing immorality is itself no reason to criminalize.
1 They need not, in other words, rest their liberalism on an allegedly exhaustive list of criminalization's upsides. They need only claim that whatever those upsides turn out to be, they make a case for criminalization that is defeated by criminalization's downsides whenever criminalization is not likely to prevent harm (or offence). 2 Similarly, those on the moralist side need not claim that preventing immorality is itself sufficient reason to criminalize. 3 They need not, in other words, claim to have identified an upside that always wins the day. They need only claim that preventing immorality is always a reason to criminalize, such that one cannot help oneself to the conclusion that where harm (or offence) will not be prevented, there is nothing to say for criminalization. The conflict described above predictably turns out to be a phony war. One can join with the moralists in claiming that the prevention of immorality is always a reason to criminalize. And one can join with the liberals in claiming that said reason is defeated when criminalization is not likely to prevent harm (or offence). One can, in short, be a liberal and a moralist at the same time. Of course, those who take this compromise position may continue to disagree about the details: they may disagree about whether the prevention of harm (or offence) need always accompany the prevention of immorality. Perhaps this is at most a sensible rule of thumb. To reach that point, however, is to have long abandoned the battle lines drawn above: if the mere prevention of immorality were itself no reason to criminalize, the possibility of dispensing with other such reasons-like the prevention of harm (or offence)-would be a non-starter.
The easy caricature with which we began misleads for a further reason. It misleads because it leaves out an influential third line of thought: the thought that it is important to the case for criminalizing φing that φing is in some sense a public matter. 4 It leaves out the thought, as it is now commonly put, that all crimes should be public wrongs. This thought is most familiar from the work of Antony Duff and Sandra Marshall. In their hands it becomes a thesis about criminalization's upsides.
As Duff puts it, 'we have good reason to criminalise some type of conduct if (and only if) it constitutes a public wrong '; 5 'what concerns the criminal law is not moral wrongdoing as such, but only public wrongdoing: we have no reason at all to criminalise the betrayal of a friend's confidence, or a philanderer's sexual infidelity, 4 As Doug Husak puts it, 'The reason we should not punish a breach of contract or a tort, for example, is not because these behaviors are not wrongful but because these wrongful behaviors are private.' See because these are not public wrongs '. 6 Duff is thus no part of the liberal-moralist compromise described above. For him, there is reason to criminalize any public wrong, but no reason at all to criminalize other moral wrongs. There is thus no need to invoke the downsides of criminalization to explain why the latter class of wrongs should not be crimes: there is simply no case for their criminalization. Of course, those sympathetic to the thought about public wrongs need not accept this last claim.
Instead, they may make a move similar to that made by the liberal: they may argue that whatever reasons for criminalization exist, the downsides of criminalization defeat those reasons unless what is criminalized is a public wrong. Those who take this view can endorse the liberal-moralist compromise, while adding something to it.
They can claim that there is reason to criminalize φing if this will likely prevent immorality, but that φing is permissibly criminalized only if it is true both that criminalizing φing will likely prevent harm (or offence), and that φing is a public wrong.
In this paper we evaluate the third line of thought, both in the form that is compatible with, and in the form that is hostile to, the liberal-moralist compromise.
Our discussion comes in four parts. Part 2 considers what it is to say that a wrong is public. Part 3 explores what we call the positive thesis. According to that thesis, it is the fact that a wrong is public that gives us reason to criminalize that wrong. Part 4 explores what we call the negative thesis. According to that thesis, it is a necessary condition of there being reason to criminalize some wrong, or of that wrong's being permissibly criminalized, that the wrong is public. We argue that both theses should be rejected.
6 RA Duff, 'Towards a Theory of Criminal Law? ' (2010) 84 Aristotelian Society Supp Vol 1, 9.
What makes a wrong public?
Assume that there is reason to criminalize φing, or that φing is permissibly criminalized. It is tempting to think that there must be something public about φing.
After all, public officials create criminal laws. And public officials are empowered to bring, or take over, criminal proceedings. This suggests a first possible account of what makes a wrong public: perhaps public wrongs are those wrongs with certain normative implications for public officials. On the widest possible version of this view, φing is a public wrong if and only if φing gives public officials some reason for action. This view might be narrowed either by reference to what a public wrong gives public officials reason to do, and/or by reference to the properties of the reason that it gives them. As to the former, public wrongs might be wrongs that give officials reason to discourage, or regulate, or prohibit, or criminalise or punish φing. As to the latter, public wrongs might give officials not just any old reason, but a reason that permits or requires them to do one of the aforementioned things.
We need not adjudicate between these possible accounts here, for all suffer from a common problem. If any such account is offered as definitive of a public wrong, then to say that φing is a public wrong is to announce the conclusion of an argument rather than one of its premises. Take the suggestion that public wrongs are wrongs officials have reason to prohibit. Whatever considerations establish that officials have reason to prohibit some wrong, also establish, on this view, that the wrong is public. So the fact a wrong is public cannot be among the considerations that establish that officials have reason to prohibit the wrong. That would be to include one's conclusion among one's premises. The same point can be made about the accounts offered by Grant Lamond and Ambrose Lee. For them, public wrongs are wrongs public officials ought to punish. 7 Whatever considerations establish that officials ought to punish people for some wrong, also establish, on this view, that the wrong is public. As Lee acknowledges, the fact a wrong is public cannot then be among the considerations that establish that officials ought to punish its perpetrators.
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We can put the general point here as follows: if we accept the above accounts of public wrongfulness, 'public wrong' becomes the label we attach to a category of wrongs, only after we have worked out that those wrongs have certain normative implications for public officials. Our grounds for thinking that a wrong has these normative implications for officials must thus be independent of the idea of public wrongfulness itself. It follows that the idea of public wrongfulness-so understood- If this is what is meant by a public wrong, both the positive and the negative thesis are false. First, the fact that φing is a public wrong cannot plausibly give us reason to criminalize it. That φing does not fall within the private sphere hardly shows that there is anything that counts in favour of its criminalisation. Second, the fact that φing is a public wrong cannot plausibly be a necessary condition of there being reason to criminalize it. That criminalization intrudes into the private sphere does not show there is nothing that counts in its favour. It is partly because law-makers often do have weighty reasons to so intrude that the right to a private life is so important. Finally, it cannot plausibly be permissible to criminalize only public wrongs. The right to a private life is not absolute: intrusion into the private sphere can sometimes be justified, and there is no reason to think that criminalization is never a justified intrusion. 9 One might deny this by claiming that the private sphere just is made up of activities that the law in general, or the criminal law in particular, may not prohibit.
But that claim only succeeds in converting the idea of a public wrong back into a 9 Obvious counterexamples are domestic violence and marital rape.
conclusion: public wrongs are now simply those wrongs that the (criminal) law may prohibit. So understood, the idea of a public wrong again cannot help us establish which wrongs may be prohibited.
To avoid these problems another understanding of a public wrong is needed.
Consider the following possibility. Instead of treating the word public as a reference to public officials, or as a reference to a residually public sphere, we might treat the word public as a reference to members of the public. When plugged into the negative thesis, this implies that those who are able to successfully conceal their wrongdoing thereby cancel the reasons to criminalize it, or render its criminalization impermissible.
Another option is to point to public perception: perhaps what makes members of the public victims of a wrong is the fact they perceive it as an attack on them all. This option is persuasively critiqued by Lamond (n 7) at 617. 12 We return below to the conception of citizenship utilized by Duff and Marshall. In the meantime, we follow them in using citizenship to refer to membership of a political community. to use the criminal law, or it is impermissible to do so. These are conclusions many reject. It is thus worth exploring whether they can be defended.
The Positive Thesis
According to the positive thesis, it is the fact a wrong is public that gives us reason to 21 'As public wrongs, potential crimes must violate a value on which the civic enterprise depends': Duff (n 13) 139. answer for it; that is how I take both her and her wrongful conduct seriously.
And that is what the criminal law does in relation to public wrongdoing: it calls alleged perpetrators of such wrongs to account, and holds them formally answerable for their commissions of such wrongs through the criminal trial.
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If this is right, we can argue as follows:
(1) Members of the polity have duties to answer to one another for public wrongs, and to call one another to answer for those wrongs;
(2) If a public wrong is made a criminal offence, its perpetrators will be called to answer for their wrongdoing in a criminal court, and some will answer for those wrongs;
(3) That a wrong is public provides reason to criminalize that wrong.
(3) follows from (1) and (2) But this cannot itself be enough to generate reasons for action. Suppose that Jane thinks that cutting the red wire will defuse a bomb and save lives. Jane takes cutting the red wire to be of value. But if cutting the red wire will instead cause the bomb to explode, Jane has no reason at all to cut it. 25 Duff would no doubt reply that this misses his point. An autonomy-based wrong is a public wrong only if it both violates the polity's defining values and is actually a wrong. 26 And it is only actually a wrong if autonomy is of value. Alas, this only creates another puzzle: if the fact X is of value is insufficient to give members of a community reasons for action qua members, and if the fact X is valued is also insufficient to them such reasons, why think that the combination of these facts is sufficient?
One possible answer derives from the thought that some communities are themselves of value. Think of families, neighbourhoods, sports teams, or universities.
As members of these communities we have certain obligations to fellow members in virtue of our membership. The fact that members have these obligations is part of what makes such communities of value. Can we make the same claims about political communities? One might argue that we can. One might argue that a political community is itself of value when its members self-identify as members of the community, and take the success of their lives to consist partly in that ongoing 25 The example is drawn from David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously (OUP 2011) 22-3. 26 Duff is sometimes misunderstood on this point. Michael Moore takes Duff to be claiming that the fact that X violates one of the polity's defining values suffices to make X a public wrong: 'No selfrespecting retributivist should find there to be any justice achieved by prohibiting and then punishing behaviours that are only conventionally regarded as wrong, even when those conventional moral beliefs are so deeply held that they are (and are conventionally regarded as being) essential to the Imagine Bill is one of these people. Bill self-identifies as a Canadian citizen.
He takes his citizenship to connect him to other Canadians, who together form a community that is, inter alia, a just community in which to live; 29 Bill takes his life to go better because of this connection. Assume other Canadian citizens are like Bill.
Can we conclude that the Canadian political community is itself of value? That depends. The connection between Bill and his fellow Canadians may be no more than apparent. The Canadian political community may in fact be unjust. If it is, the fact that Bill and other Canadians take its being just to make their lives go better does nothing to make that community of value. It simply shows that their lives are going less well than they think. Now whether a polity is just, of course, depends on many things. But in a non-ideal world one thing it depends on is what the community does in response to injustice. Political communities that value justice-it might be argued-are political communities in which, inter alia, the members are duty-bound to call one another to answer for injustices they perpetrate. For Bill and his fellow 27 Marshall and Duff (n 10) 21.
28 Duff (n 6) 5.
29 By justice here, we mean to refer to one moral value among others. Canadians, the existence of such duties helps make their conception of the community-and of themselves-a reality. In Duff and Marshall's words, it helps the community to 'remain true to itself', thereby contributing to the success of the lives of Bill and his fellow members. 30 Just as with families, neighbourhoods, sports teams and universities, such duties help make the political community a community of value.
Here, then, is a possible answer to the foregoing puzzle: if X's being valuable and X's being valued are individually insufficient to give us reason to do anything, why should the conjunction give us reasons-let alone duties-to answer for X-based wrongs? According to the account sketched here, our having these duties is partly constitutive of a valuable type of political community, a community that lives up to the conception its members have of the community and of themselves. Such a community could not exist if its members did not have these duties. If this is right, members' duties to answer-and call one another to answer-for public wrongs are associative duties. They are duties members of a community have, in virtue of their membership, and which help make that community a community of value. Duff seems to endorse this defence of (1). In his view:
The criminal law gives institutional form to a particular subset of what we might call secondary associative obligations: associative because they are obligations we owe to our fellow citizens in virtue of our shared membership of the polity; secondary because they concern our civic responses to breaches of the primary obligations that the criminal law presupposes-to commissions of the kinds of wrong with which the criminal law is concerned. As citizens, 30 Duff and Marshall (n 13) 83.
we have a special duty to attend to public wrongs committed within the polity: a duty to respond to such wrongs by calling the wrongdoer to public account, which we owe to both victim and wrongdoer; a duty to answer to our fellows for our own commissions of such wrongs, and to answer to any accusations of such wrongdoing that are reasonably brought against us.
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If this defence succeeds, we should accept (3): we should accept that the fact a wrong is public in Duff and Marshall's sense generates a reason to criminalize that wrong.
A. Distortion
One way to test Duff and Marshall's account is to ask whether it gives us a plausible account of the reasons to criminalize wrongs that almost everyone agrees should be criminalized-wrongs such as murder, robbery or rape. Duff and Marshall accuse other writers of defending accounts that fail this test. This includes some accounts mentioned above-those that characterize members of the public as victims of public wrongs, on the ground that such wrongs tend to cause social volatility or take unfair advantage of the law-abiding. 32 According to Duff and Marshall, such accounts do seem to subordinate the individual victim (a concern for their good, or the wrong done to them) to some supposedly larger social good.
The offender's conduct is counted as criminal, and he is to be punished, for the sake of that larger good: to which it is appropriate to object that his 31 Duff (n 13) 140. 32 See n 11.
conduct should be criminalized because of, and he should be punished for, the wrong he does to the individual victim.
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These rival accounts 'distort' the reasons there are to criminalize familiar mala in se, by picking out the wrong feature-social volatility or the taking of unfair advantage-as the feature that gives us reason to criminalize murder or rape. 34 There is reason to criminalize such act-types, Duff and Marshall claim, not because of these further features, but because they are wrongs: 'if we are to give the victims their due, the criminal law's attention must be on the wrongs that they have suffered '. 35 Call this the distortion objection.
The distortion objection can be turned against Duff and Marshall's own view.
We already saw that for them, there is reason to criminalize public wrongs because citizens thereby discharge duties to call one another to answer. And we saw that those duties exist because their existence helps constitute a valuable type of community.
Yet this appeal to community seems to be precisely the appeal to a 'larger social good' for which Duff and Marshall criticize rival accounts. On their view, there is reason to criminalize public wrongs, and thereby call offenders to answer, precisely 'for the sake of that larger good'-precisely so that citizens are members of a community that lives up to their conception of the community and of themselves. a person may act from generosity or loyalty, and act in a counter-utilitarian way, and not attract the charge of moral self-indulgence, but that charge will be attracted if the suspicion is that his act is motivated by a concern for his own generosity or loyalty, the enhancement or preservation of his own selfimage as a generous or loyal person. 46 A different interpretation of Duff and Marshall's account would take them to be concerned not with how community members conceive of the community, but the way in which the community presents itself. The reason to criminalize murder or theft or rape, on this view, is that the community's claim to value life, or private property, or sexual autonomy, would be false if these wrongs were not criminalized. This view seems to us to fare no better against the distortion objection. We are to criminalize for the reason that, if we do not, our claims about ourselves will be false. So our concern when we criminalize is to mould reality in order to reflect our self-image. This seems to us a no less self-indulgent reason to criminalize than the one we consider in the text.
other words, that they ignore the interests of wrongdoers and victims, and take account only of the interests of third parties like Bill. It is rather that Duff and
Marshall only take into account interests shared by wrongdoers, victims and third parties alike: the interest all three have, as citizens, in the character of the community of which they are members.
Indeed, this line of thought suggests a second possible objection to Duff and Marshall. For their view, we claim, does fail to take proper account of the interests of some people, a failure that leads to further distortion. Recall the argument with which we began section 3:
(3) That a wrong is public gives us reason to criminalize that wrong.
We explained above that (1) We are left with no satisfactory answer to the question we posed to Duff and Marshall: why should the fact that a wrong is public in their sense give us reason to criminalize that wrong? Absent such an answer, we conclude that the positive thesis should be rejected.
The Negative Thesis
Let us turn, then, to the negative thesis. Two versions of that thesis can be distinguished. According to the first version, it is a necessary condition of there being a reason to criminalize some wrong that the wrong has the property of being public.
As we saw in section 1, this is Duff's view. According to the second version, it is a necessary condition of the permissible criminalization of some wrong that the wrong 54 Marshall and Duff (n 10) 21.
has the property of being public. This version has the apparent attraction of enabling Accident: A is out walking when she comes across a car accident. C, the driver of one vehicle, has a serious leg injury. B, a doctor, who has also come across the accident, begins to treat the driver of the other vehicle. While doing so, B issues directives telling A how C should be treated. If A treats B's directives as authoritative, A is likely to stop C from losing a leg. If A does otherwise, C's leg will be lost.
In Accident, it seems clear that-on the conception of authority endorsed by
Gardner-B has authority to direct A to treat C in certain ways. B's directives are within the scope of that authority. Now imagine that A fails to do as directed. No doubt, A is answerable to C. Had A done as directed, C would not have lost her leg.
So if C demands answers, A has a duty to give them. But if B were to track A down the following week and demand an answer for A's disobedience, it does not seem that A would need to answer to her. It would be enough (would it not?) for A to say: I gave C my reasons.
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These claims can be defended in the following way. In Accident, B has authority over A because C's interest in saving her leg gives A reason (indeed a duty)
to take steps to save it, and because A is more likely to conform to that reason (and do her duty) by treating B's directives as authoritative. This is why A is duty-bound to do 64 Our discussion here is influenced by that in D Enoch, 'Authority and Reason-Giving' (2014) 89
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 296, 323-8.
as B directs. Now if A breaches her duty, the reasons that add up to give A that duty do not simply disappear. Were this so, we could escape our duties simply by failing to conform to them. The better view is that the reasons A is given by C's interest in her leg continue to exert normative force. As Gardner himself has argued, though A cannot now conform to them fully, those reasons now count in favour of A's doing the next best thing. 65 One thing this plausibly requires is that A explain why she did as she did-that she offer answers for her breach of duty. But if there is anyone to whom such answers are owed, it is surely C, whose interests gave A-and continue to give A-the very reasons that are now reasons for A to answer. If this is correct, it explains why it would be enough for A to reply to B that she gave C her reasons. It would be enough because it is C's interests that explain why A must answer at all.
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If this is right, Gardner is wrong to suggest that A is answerable to B for φing whenever A's φing breaches a directive of B's that is within the scope of B's authority. In Accident, A is answerable to C, whose interests give A the reasons that ground B's authority over A. If A answers to C, she need not answer to B. It follows that the public responsibility principle is not automatically engaged whenever A violates laws-like the traffic laws mentioned by Gardner-that are authoritative for A. True, our argument implies that A is answerable to her fellow road-users, whose interests give A the reasons-to drive safely-that ground whatever authority the law has over A. It does not follow, however, that A is answerable to public officials.
B. Officials as surrogates
If Gardner's view is to be rejected, when is one publicly responsible? Let us start by considering a case in which it would be wrong for A to φ. We can leave open whether φing is wrong independently of the law, or whether it is wrong partly because of the law. Suppose that there is some class of individuals who benefit from A's not φing, and whose interests help to make it the case that A has a duty not to φ. These people, we might say, are the beneficiaries of A's duty. Gardner mentions 'insider trading, narcotics, theft, gambling, homicide, kidnapping' and road traffic offences. The beneficiaries of the latter are A's fellow road users; in the case of insider trading, they are other participants in the relevant financial system; in the case of narcotics, those harmed by their availability; and so on. In each of these cases, if A breaches her duty not to φ, then as in Accident, A is answerable to those beneficiaries. Why? Because the reasons that gave A her duty-reasons given by the interests of the beneficiariescontinue to call out for next-best compliance, and because answering to the beneficiaries is part of what such compliance requires.
None of this shows that A is publicly responsible. To show that, we must show that A is answerable to public officials. As we saw in section 3, on Duff's analysis A is answerable because her fellow citizens, whom public officials represent, themselves have an interest in A's wrongdoing. But that move is not required here.
Notice that in all the cases Gardner mentions, and many others, beneficiaries tend to be poorly placed to get the answers owed. In some cases, they lack the expertise required to reliably detect violations. In others, they can be easily intimidated, or manipulated by A. Even where this is not so, leaving things to beneficiaries is a recipe for wasteful duplication of effort, as various members of that class try to obtain the answers owed. And even if duplication can somehow be avoided, the effort required may come at a significant cost: getting answers from wrongdoers often requires a significant investment of time and energy, lessening one's ability to pursue one's own projects and goals. The fact that beneficiaries have their own lives to lead also generates a further problem: in cases where no-one is harmed, beneficiaries are unlikely to be inclined to bring proceedings, even if A's conduct creates great risks. This is to say nothing of the danger, especially where harm is caused, of leaving victims with the task of holding A responsible. There is a standing risk that what starts as a quest for answers will result in little more than confrontation; that some will seek revenge whether or not answers are forthcoming; and that those on the receiving end will retaliate accordingly.
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When we say that beneficiaries are poorly placed to get the answers they are owed, it is costs of all these kinds that we have in mind. Where beneficiaries are so placed, public officials are often better placed to get answers on their behalf. Of course, this is not always so. Such officials may be incompetent or corrupt. But where these evils are avoided, putting officials in control of proceedings can help to solve problems of duplicated effort, unreliable detection, intimidation and manipulation.
And by charging such officials with getting the answers owed, we achieve a valuable division of labour: while officials are busy getting answers, the rest of us are freed up to get on with the rest of our lives, and conform to our other responsibilities. 68 What's 67 Compare Gardner (n 55) 213ff, discussing what he calls the criminal law's displacement function. 68 On dividing moral labour more generally, see S Scheffler, 'Egalitarian Liberalism as Moral more, the expectation that officials can be relied on to bring proceedings against φers can help sap the incentive to confront suspects, and remove some of the temptation to seek revenge. Considerations of all these kinds help make the case for an official right to call suspected φers to answer on behalf of beneficiaries, and for a corresponding duty to answer. 69 They help make the case, in other words, for public responsibility.
If we are right, the question whether the public responsibility principle is engaged, at least in the type of case described above, 70 depends heavily on empirical facts. It depends on whether the aforementioned advantages will be achieved by people follow a common set of rules and appeal to a common authority to adjudicate conflicts under these rules.
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These benefits underpin norms of sovereignty in international law. They would be jeopardized were officials to take it upon themselves to enact and enforce law for other states, whenever they believe that doing so would result in answers being given by those who owe them. Not only would those within each territory lose the ability to determine which rules, and which institutions, would resolve disputes about their rights and duties, but damaging conflict between states would be bound to increase. The rival view we have sketched has the opposite implication. All else being equal, the more obstacles beneficiaries of X-based duties face in getting answers for themselves, the better suited are public officials to do so on their behalf. Where public officials are well-placed to call X-based wrongdoers to answer, those wrongdoers are publicly responsible for their wrongs, so officials have a right to call them. Far from weakening the case for public responsibility, the community's failure to value X thus strengthens that case.
It may help to consider an example. Some claim that distributive equality is of value because it is a requirement of justice. Let's assume they are correct. Now imagine a political community which, over a period of decades, repeatedly passes laws exacerbating distributive inequalities. It is hard to see how distributive equality could be a defining value of this community. And it is easy to see why beneficiaries of egalitarian duties might struggle to get the answers they are owed. In a highly unequal society, those at the top are unlikely to answer readily to those at the bottom.
And those at the bottom are unlikely to have the means or the opportunity to effectively call those at the top to answer for wrongdoing. In this community, Duff, voice in which we speak to ourselves, as citizens, of the shared values and goals by which our civic enterprise as a polity is constituted.
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We have already argued that not everyone to whom criminal law speaks is a citizen (or, indeed, a guest) in Duff's sense. Even leaving that aside, however, why think that the only way criminal law should speak to people is in terms of values they already endorse? There need be nothing disrespectful about trying to get people to explain themselves when they fail to value that which is of value. Assuming we are wellplaced to get an explanation, we may show less disrespect by seeking it, than by standing by and doing nothing. By those who acted wrongly we may later be asked:
why didn't you say anything at the time? 76 Duff's point, of course, is that it is a long road from the observation that public officials may seek answers from a wrongdoer, to the conclusion that they may seek those answers via the criminal law. We agree. At the very least, criminal proceedings need to be an effective way of getting the answers owed. Getting answers via criminal law must also come at an acceptable cost in other values. Criminal law is a blunt instrument operated by fallible agents, and it cannot be assumed that we are justified in using it whenever it will get answers wrongdoers owe. None of this shows, however, that criminal wrongs must be those for which we are answerable to our fellow citizens. So we are yet to see why they must be public wrongs.
Consider an alternative argument. Duff offers his version of the communitarian account not as a purely normative theory but as a rational reconstruction of criminal law. 81 Such an account must not depart too radically from the phenomena that provide its subject matter (lest it cease to be reconstructive); and it must offer an account of the goods which are immanent in, and help to justify, that subject matter (lest it cease to be rational in the relevant sense).
Though we cannot develop the point in detail here, we doubt that the communitarian conception scores well when measured against either of these criteria. does not depend on whether the wrong is public. Nor is there any reason to think that criminal law in particular should only concern itself with public wrongs. We conclude that the negative thesis should be rejected.
Conclusion
We have considered two ways in which the concept of a public wrong might be of use to those thinking about permissible criminalization. According to the positive thesis, it is the fact a wrong is public that provides reason to criminalize that wrong. According to the negative thesis, the fact a wrong is public is a necessary condition of there being reason, or of it being permissible, to criminalize that wrong.
Whether either thesis is true depends on what a public wrong is. We considered several accounts. On some accounts, the label public wrong is simply the label given to whatever there is reason to criminalize (or prohibit, or punish, etc) or whatever is permissibly criminalized (or prohibited, or punished, etc). On these accounts, the claim that something is a public wrong is the conclusion of an argument, 82 It is, of course, a further question whether that right should be exercised in a given case.
not one of its premises. Such accounts guarantee that both theses are true. But that truth is ultimately trivial.
If the idea of a public wrong is to figure as a premise in arguments about reasons to criminalize, or about permissible criminalization, a different account is required. The search for such an account led us to the work of Duff, Marshall and Husak. For these writers, public wrongs are wrongs that violate the shared, or
defining, values of a political community. We argued that this account fails to vindicate either thesis. When it is plugged into the positive thesis, it distorts our reasons to criminalize familiar mala in se like murder, robbery and rape. The account might instead be plugged into the negative thesis. It might be argued that wrongs are permissibly criminalized only if the wrongdoers are publicly responsible, and that only those who commit public wrongs are responsible in this way. This argument also fails. Public responsibility does not depend on whether a wrong is public in Duff,
Marshall and Husak's sense. We cannot rule out the possibility that some other account of a public wrong avoids our objections. Having considered the leading accounts on offer, we doubt such an account will be forthcoming. In its absence, it would be better, when we think about permissible criminalization, to do without the idea of a public wrong.
